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WHAT’S HUD GOT TO DO WITH IT?:
HOW HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE
MAY SAVE THE FAIR HOUSING ACT’S
DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD
William F. Fuller*
Since 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari three times on
the question of whether disparate impact liability is cognizable under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA). The first two times, the parties settled. The
question is before the Court once again in Texas Department of Housing &
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., and this time
the parties seem unlikely to settle.
Disparate impact liability in the civil rights context entails liability for
actions that have a discriminatory effect, regardless of an actor’s motive.
Under the FHA, this can translate into liability for actions that make
housing disproportionately unavailable for persons of a protected class or
actions that tend to increase or maintain segregated housing patterns.
All eleven federal circuit courts that have addressed the question agree
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. In addition, in
the spring of 2013, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) promulgated a rule that standardizes the burdens of
proof for disparate impact claims under the FHA and specifically states for
the first time in a formal administrative rule that disparate impact claims
are cognizable under the FHA.
The promulgation of HUD’s disparate impact rule means that this time
around the Supreme Court must give heightened deference to an
interpretation of the FHA that authorizes disparate impact claims. This
Note argues that despite the near-unanimity of the circuit courts’
interpretation of the FHA, the fate of disparate impact claims under the
FHA was anything but certain prior to the promulgation of the HUD rule.
The HUD rule makes it much more likely that the FHA disparate impact
standard will survive, and this Note argues that it should.

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, University at
Albany, State University of New York. I would like to thank Professor David Schmudde
and Professor Olivier Sylvain for their guidance and my family and friends for their support.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari three times1
on the question of whether disparate impact claims—claims brought against
a defendant for the discriminatory effect of an action, regardless of the
actor’s intent—are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act2 (FHA).
However, the Supreme Court has yet to decide this question; the first two
times, the cases settled before oral arguments could be heard. Now, the
issue is before the Court a third time and the parties seem unlikely to settle.3
For the past forty years, federal circuit courts have allowed disparate
impact claims under the FHA,4 and all eleven circuits that have decided the
issue agree.5 In addition, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the federal agency charged with implementing the
FHA, has promulgated a rule that formally establishes that disparate impact
claims can be brought under the FHA and standardizes the burdens of proof
for the parties in such a case.6 This new rule is important because HUD’s
interpretation of the FHA is afforded a certain amount of deference when
the statute is under judicial review.7
The FHA declares the policy of the federal government is “to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.”8 To accomplish this goal, the FHA aims to (1) prevent and arrest
1. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824, cert.
dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012).
3. See Greg Stohr, Showdown Over Landmark Housing Law Looms at U.S. Supreme
Court, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0925/showdown-over-landmark-housing-law-looms-at-u-s-supreme-court.html.
4. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500).
5. See id.
6. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,474–75.
7. See infra Part I.B.2.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
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discrimination in housing and (2) desegregate communities within the
United States.9
Despite these admirable goals, housing segregation has declined only
slightly since the passage of the FHA in 1968.10 One way to measure the
rate of segregation in a geographical area or community is the 100-point
“dissimilarity index,” in which a score of 100 indicates total segregation, a
score of zero “indicat[es] a population that is randomly distributed by race,”
and a score of sixty or higher is considered “highly segregated.”11 As of
2000, twelve major American cities, including New York, Washington,
D.C., Philadelphia, and Chicago, had dissimilarity indexes over eighty.12
The causes of such de facto segregation are varied and include:
economic factors, individual preferences of white persons to live in
predominantly white neighborhoods, and disparate treatment of people of
color by landlords and sellers of property.13 The effect of these conditions
is self-perpetuating segregation and discrimination.14 Racial minorities
living in “ghetto-like enclaves” suffer from higher rates of disease,
unemployment, crime, and reduced educational and financial
opportunities.15 This, in turn, has the negative effect of reinforcing
stereotypes and reinforcing the preference of whites to live in majoritywhite neighborhoods.16
The government has played a role in perpetuating segregation and
stereotypes by enforcing housing codes more strictly in minority-occupied
housing,17 “providing inferior municipal services to minority
neighborhoods[,] . . . and, perhaps the most common of all, employing
zoning and other land-use techniques to block or limit the location of
affordable housing developments.”18
Disparate impact claims are often used to challenge the effects of zoning
policies and urban redevelopment projects. Some argue that these claims
are vital to decreasing segregation today and preventing segregation
patterns in the future.19 The disparate impact standard is especially
9. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,466; see also United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100–01 (2d
Cir. 1988) (discussing the “dual goals” of the FHA).
10. See Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A
Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate,
100 KY. L.J. 125, 131 (2011).
11. Id.
12. See id. at 132.
13. See id. at 134–35.
14. See id. at 135 (“The economic/attitudinal causes of segregation and on-going
discrimination reinforce one another.”).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. In some neighborhoods, this has the effect of making affordable rental housing
unavailable for a larger proportion of people of color. See infra notes 116–28 and
accompanying text (discussing such an effect in Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012)).
18. Schwemm, supra note 10, at 136.
19. See Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and
the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 576
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important in urban redevelopment decisions—one of the main factors
shaping U.S. cities and towns—because these decisions are usually made
through diffuse processes in which intentional discrimination may be
impossible to prove.20
Considering the near unanimity21 with which federal courts and agencies
have allowed disparate impact claims under the FHA and the arguably vital
role disparate impact claims have in furthering the policies of the United
States, why has the Supreme Court shown a recent interest in this issue?
This Note aims to shine some light on this question and also addresses the
issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.
In Part I, this Note contextualizes the FHA in the social and legal
landscape at the time of its passage. It then defines disparate impact in the
context of fair housing, describes the roots of this legal concept as it
pertains to FHA claims, and shows how disparate impact claims are proven
using the prima facie case and burden-shifting regimes of HUD’s disparate
impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. Last, this part briefly describes the
legislative history of the FHA and courts’ and commentators’ interpretation
of that history to determine whether disparate impact liability is cognizable
under the Act.
Part II of this Note introduces the three cases in which the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari on the question of whether disparate impact claims
are cognizable under the FHA. It then describes the development of FHA
disparate impact case law, the precedents upon which the circuit courts
relied, and the reasoning behind the decisions. Next, Part II discusses two
recent Supreme Court cases that interpret language from other civil rights
statutes that is arguably similar to the FHA’s language. Then, Part II
examines how these cases have affected recent interpretations of the FHA
and how they might affect the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FHA in
the future. Finally, this part discusses the limited instances in which federal
courts have reviewed the HUD disparate impact rule.
In Part III, this Note argues that the disparate impact standard of the FHA
cannot stand on the prevalence or consistency of judicial precedent alone
because the case law is rife with fundamental, logical holes. Instead, this
Note argues, the disparate impact standard under the FHA must rest on
statutory interpretation alone. Because the text of the FHA is ambiguous as
to the cognizability of disparate impact claims, the survival of the disparate
impact standard will rise and fall on the reasonability of HUD’s
(2014) (arguing that the FHA’s success depends on a disparate impact plaintiff’s ability to
challenge housing decisions that are made through diffuse processes in which discriminatory
intent may be impossible to prove); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any
Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 411–19 (2013) (arguing that, despite the relatively low
rate of success for individual disparate impact claims, the disparate impact standard is a vital
tool in accomplishing the goals of the FHA).
20. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 576.
21. So far, the D.C. District Court is the only federal court to hold that disparate impact
claims are not cognizable under the FHA. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014).
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interpretation of the statute. Finally, this Note argues that HUD’s
interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND
A BASIC PRIMER TO HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE
Part I introduces the FHA by first describing the historical and legal
contexts in which Congress passed the FHA. This part goes on to define
“disparate impact” and describe the historical legal development of
disparate impact cases under the FHA.
Next, Part I describes HUD’s disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
This part introduces the text of the rule and explains how the rule creates a
burden-shifting test for determining disparate impact liability under the
FHA. Then, this part explains the deference standard that courts apply to
agency rules and interpretations that implement a statute when that statute is
under judicial review.
Finally, this part briefly describes the use of the FHA’s legislative history
to determine Congress’s purpose and the meaning of the FHA as it pertains
to disparate impact claims.
A. An Overview of the Fair Housing Act
This section begins by briefly painting a picture of the cultural and legal
climate in which the FHA was enacted. It then describes how the disparate
impact standard functions in other areas of the law, particularly in
constitutional equal protection and employment discrimination claims,
which constitute the historical provenance of FHA disparate impact claims.
Finally, this section illustrates how the FHA disparate impact standard
functions in a practical sense by outlining the burdens of proof that each
party bears in a FHA disparate impact claim.
1. The Historical Context of the Fair Housing Act
The FHA was passed at a moment of heightened racial tension in the
United States.22 Beginning in the mid-1960s, riots broke out in a number of
African American urban areas.23 In response, President Lyndon Johnson
commissioned a report on civil unrest in urban areas, known as the Kerner
Report, which concluded that: “Race prejudice has shaped our history
decisively; it now threatens to affect our future. White racism is essentially
responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our
cities since the end of World War II.”24 Among other things, the report

22. For a more complete discussion of the social context in which the FHA was enacted,
see Schneider, supra note 19, at 549–53.
23. Id. at 552.
24. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS: SUMMARY OF THE REPORT 9 (1968)
[hereinafter KERNER REPORT]; see also Schneider, supra note 19, at 551–53 (discussing the
effect of the Kerner Report).
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recommended “the elimination of barriers to choice in housing and the
passage of a national and enforceable ‘open housing law.’”25
This report was released on March 1, 1968, in the midst of a Senate
filibuster to block the passage of the FHA, and the report’s release acted as
a push to garner the two-thirds vote needed to end the filibuster and pass the
bill through the Senate on March 11, 1968.26 The assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 of the same year “served as a catalyst
for the [FHA’s] quick passage through the House with its essential
provisions intact.”27 President Johnson signed the FHA into law exactly
one week after Dr. King’s assassination.28
The year 1968 “marked the beginning of the modern era of fair housing
law.”29 In addition to the passage of the FHA, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,30 the Supreme Court construed the Civil Rights Act of 186631 to
prohibit racial discrimination in both private and public housing.32 As
Robert G. Schwemm, a preeminent scholar in the field of fair housing law,
notes in his treatise, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation, the
combined effect of the passage of the FHA and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Jones meant that the private housing market would be subject to
federal antidiscrimination laws for the first time.33
The FHA differs from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in key ways. First,
the FHA extends the protections of the federal fair housing laws to personal
traits not covered in the Civil Rights Act of 1866—which only prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race or color—such as religion, sex, familial
status, handicap or disability, and national origin.34
Second, the FHA expands the scope, under federal law, of the type of
discriminatory acts that are prohibited in the housing context. Whereas
prior to 1968 only discrimination in the sale or rental of property was
25. Schneider, supra note 19, at 553 (quoting KERNER REPORT, supra note 24, at 23); see
also Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under
the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25 (2008).
26. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 553.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION, § 1:1
(2014).
30. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
32. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413; SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 1:1. The Jones Court
specifically dealt with the provision now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). See Jones,
392 U.S. at 412–13. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 grants, inter alia, “[a]ll citizens of the
United States . . . the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
33. SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 1:1.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604; Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14. The prohibitions under the FHA,
however, are not broader than those found in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in every sense;
rather, they are different in scope. See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27. For
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may be used to create liability in cases of harassment,
where the harassment interferes with a person’s use and enjoyment of real (and personal)
property and is motivated by race. Id. § 27:12. It is not always the case that liability exists
under the FHA for acts of harassment in the housing context, even when it is motivated by
the victim’s protected trait. See generally Oliveri, supra note 25.
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prohibited,35 the FHA bars: discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or
privileges,” or “the provision of services or facilities in connection” with
the sale or rental of a dwelling;36 the making, printing, or publishing, or
causing to be made, printed, or published, “any notice, statement, or
advertisement” in connection with the sale or renting of a dwelling that
“indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination” on the basis of a
protected trait;37 “represent[ing] to any person because of [a protected trait]
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available;”38 and other actions, such as discrimination
in financing39 or brokerage services40 related to the sale or rental of a
dwelling.
Third, the FHA changes the way that housing discrimination statutes are
enforced. Whereas housing-related antidiscrimination claims under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 are enforced exclusively by private parties who
bring suit against defendants,41 the FHA allows for enforcement of its
substantive provisions by the U.S. Attorney General42 and the Secretary of
HUD,43 in addition to enforcement by private parties.44
Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Note, whereas the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 imposes liability only for intentional
discrimination in housing,45 courts often interpret the FHA as imposing
liability for both intentional discrimination and acts with a discriminatory
effect.46
2. Defining Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act
Disparate impact liability refers to the idea that civil liability can be
created under antidiscrimination laws for acts that have a discriminatory
effect, regardless of an actor’s intent.47 Disparate impact liability may be
35. See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
37. Id. § 3604(c).
38. Id. § 3604(d).
39. Id. § 3605.
40. Id. § 3606; see also Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14 (explaining that the FHA prohibits
many more discriminatory acts than the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
41. Jones, 392 U.S. at 417; SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27:21.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (authorizing the Attorney General to “commence a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court” in certain instances).
43. Id. § 3610 (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to file a housing discrimination
complaint on his or her own initiative).
44. Id. (detailing procedures for an aggrieved individual to file a complaint directly with
HUD); id. § 3613 (detailing procedures for an aggrieved individual filing a direct court
action).
45. SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 27:19.
46. E.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014). But cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t
of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 7,
2014).
47. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction,
Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409,
411 (1998).
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thought of in relation to disparate treatment, which is an act of intentional
discrimination where “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical.”48
The distinction between purposeful discrimination and neutral acts with a
discriminatory effect is not always clear. Sometimes, the disparate impact
of an action on a protected class may be critical evidence to proving
discriminatory intent.49 Other times, disparate impact is a stand-alone basis
for finding a violation of a person’s civil rights.50 This second situation is
the focus of this Note and the FHA case, Texas Department of Housing &
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,51 which is
currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. The sole question before the
Court in Inclusive Communities is:
“Are disparate-impact claims
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?”52
3. The Evolution of Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act
FHA disparate impact liability is historically rooted in analogies to
disparate impact liability in constitutional equal protection cases and Title
VII53 employment discrimination cases.54
Today, practitioners and
commentators prefer finding disparate impact liability by analogy to Title
VII,55 especially because the Supreme Court no longer recognizes disparate
impact claims in constitutional equal protection cases.56

48. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 249 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)); accord
Mahoney, supra note 47, at 411–17 (discussing the difference between disparate treatment
and disparate impact); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective
Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (1987).
49. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens writes:
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly
as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court’s opinion
might assume. I agree, of course, that a constitutional issue does not arise every
time some disproportionate impact is shown. On the other hand, when the
disproportion is [sufficiently dramatic] . . . it really does not matter whether the
standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
51. 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
52. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at i, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (No. 13-1371).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
54. See Mahoney, supra note 47, at 425–27.
55. See id. at 447–50 (arguing that the Title VII analogy is the proper basis for finding
disparate impact liability under the FHA).
56. See infra notes 183–91.
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a. Equal Protection and Its Relationship
to Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act
The first circuit court to impose disparate impact liability under the FHA
relied almost exclusively on constitutional equal protection cases that arose
in the context of fair housing.57
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”58 The Supreme Court has described the Equal Protection Clause
as “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.”59 This direction was extended to the federal government
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment60 in Bolling v.
Sharpe.61 Subsequent cases tend to treat the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as imposing the same directives of equal treatment on both
state and federal governments.62
Constitutional equal protection claims require that the claimant show that
the alleged bad actor acted with discriminatory intent.63 In the landmark
Supreme Court case Washington v. Davis,64 two African American
applicants for employment in the Washington, D.C. police department filed
a suit against the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, among others,
alleging that a written personnel test that operated to disqualify more
African American applicants than white applicants violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65 The Davis Court disagreed and held that
constitutional equal protection plaintiffs must prove that a defendant’s
action was motivated, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s protected trait.66
Prior to Davis, many federal circuit courts held that disparate impact
claims were cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.67 The Equal
Protection Clause disparate impact standard was often applied in the
housing context, and in some instances, federal courts relied on such
housing discrimination cases as direct authority for finding that the FHA
authorized disparate impact claims.68

57. See infra Part II.A.1.
58. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
59. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
60. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
62. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213–17 (1995)
(discussing the evolution of equal protection claims under the Fifth Amendment and
declining to diverge from the general rule that “obligations imposed by the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable”).
63. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 232–33.
66. Id. at 238–39.
67. See infra Part II.A.1.
68. See infra Part II.A.1.
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b. The Roots of the Disparate Impact Standard
in Title VII Employment Discrimination
and Its Effect on the Fair Housing Act
While one can no longer prove discrimination via disparate impact in
constitutional equal protection cases, disparate impact liability is firmly
grounded in employment discrimination civil rights statutes.69
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,70 an employment discrimination case, the
Supreme Court first sanctioned disparate impact liability in statutory civil
rights law.71 In Griggs, Duke Power Co. required, as a condition to
employment or advancement in the company, that employees pass a facially
neutral general intelligence test or have a high school diploma.72 The
Supreme Court held that the test requirement violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196473 because it was not a business necessity and it worked
to disqualify a disproportionately large number of African Americans.74
The Griggs Court cited Title VII, section 703(a)(2) and 703(h), as the
foundation for disparate impact liability under that Act.75 Section 703(a)(2)
makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify”
employees or to “otherwise adversely affect” an employee’s status as an
employee because of his or her race or other protected trait.76 Section
703(h) creates an exception to this rule for “any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test . . . is not designed, intended[,] or used to
discriminate because of race” or other protected trait.77
The underlying holding in Griggs, and the statutory authority on which
the Court relied, is important to understanding disparate impact liability
under the FHA, because the holding in Griggs would soon be adopted in
early disparate impact cases under the FHA,78 often by direct analogy.79
4. The Concept of the Prima Facie Case
It is important to note that a defendant is not liable for discrimination
simply because he or she takes a course of action that has a disparate impact
69. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2314 (2006) (stating that “[t]he
theory of disparate impact acquired its firm foothold in civil rights law in” the seminal
disparate impact in employment discrimination case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.).
70. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71. See Rutherglen, supra note 69, at 2314; Rutherglen, supra note 48, at 1297.
72. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
74. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32.
75. See id. at 426 n.1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), e-2(h).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
77. Id. § 2000e-2(h). This language is identical to the earlier version quoted in Griggs.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1. Section 703(a)(2) and (h) were cited in the first footnote, in the
first sentence of Griggs, but the text of the statutes received little treatment after that, as the
Court instead relied on legislative history and the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute. See
id. at 434–36.
78. For a more thorough discussion of this, see infra Part II.A.2.
79. See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights
II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977).
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on a protected class.80 For both disparate treatment and disparate impact
cases, without direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs must rely
on circumstantial evidence, governed by the prima facie case framework.81
The prima facie frameworks for both disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims under the FHA were adopted directly from Title VII.82
For example, the prima facie framework for disparate treatment under the
FHA is derived directly from the landmark Supreme Court case McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,83 which established the prima facie case and
burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment claims.84 For
disparate impact claims under the FHA, the framework is again borrowed
from Title VII, this time mirroring the disparate impact framework codified
in section 703(k).85 HUD’s newly promulgated disparate impact rule,
discussed below, lays out the burden-shifting framework for disparate
impact claims under the FHA.
B. HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule and Chevron Deference
This section first introduces HUD’s disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500, by explaining how it formalizes the prima facie case and burdenshifting framework for disparate impact claims under the FHA. It then
explains the reasoning behind promulgating the rule, and the need to
formalize the disparate impact standard. Last, this section explains how
courts give deference to agency rules by applying the two-step test set forth
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.86
1. HUD’s Rule: What It Says, What It Does,
and Why It Does What It Says
Under § 100.500, a prima facie case is established under the FHA87 by
showing that a defendant’s action has or had a discriminatory effect.88 An
80. Cf. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d
375, 385 (2011) (stating that courts need not worry that the disparate impact approach is too
expansive, because “the establishment of a prima facie case, by itself, is not enough to
establish liability under the FHA. It simply results in a more searching inquiry into the
defendant’s motivations . . . .”).
81. See SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 10:2.
82. See id.
83. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
84. See id. at 802 (applying the prima facie case framework to employment
discrimination cases under Title VII); SCHWEMM, supra note 29, § 10:2 & nn.26–29 (laying
out the prima facie case framework and collecting cases).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,474 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100.500) (stating that the burden-shifting scheme in HUD’s disparate impact rule
is consistent with the effects standard in Title VII); cf. Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v.
Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 4377570, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (stating that the
approach found in HUD’s disparate impact rule is similar to the approach found in section
703(k)).
86. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87. HUD states that § 100.500 applies to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)–(b), 3604(f)(1)–(2),
3605, and 3606. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,463.
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action has a discriminatory effect when it “actually or predictably results in
a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or
perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of” a protected trait.89 If a
defendant’s action has a discriminatory effect, the defendant may not be
liable if the defendant has a “legally sufficient justification” for its action.90
A legally sufficient justification is one that is “necessary to achieve one or
more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,” and cannot “be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”91
If the defendant establishes step one above—that is, that the challenged
practice is necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
purpose—then the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the
practice could be served by a less discriminatory practice.92
HUD stated that the regulation was needed “to formalize HUD’s longheld interpretation of the availability of ‘discriminatory effects’ liability
under the [FHA] and to provide nationwide consistency in the application
of that form of liability.”93 There was a need to formalize the standard
because of the various approaches that HUD and the different federal circuit
courts of appeals took when deciding disparate impact cases under the
FHA.94 Previously, HUD and several circuit courts applied varying threestep burden-shifting tests; other courts used a multifactor balancing test;
and others, still, used a mix between the two.95 At least one court applied a
different burden to private defendants and public defendants.96
Thus, HUD emphasized that it was not creating any new forms of
liability but simply formalizing the standards that courts and federal
agencies already applied in disparate impact claims.97
2. Chevron Deference
HUD has the ability to standardize the framework by which federal
courts review FHA disparate impact claims because courts are required to
give a certain level of deference to an agency’s construction of the statute

88. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 100.500(b), (c)(2).
91. Id. § 100.500(b)(i)–(ii).
92. Id. § 100.500(c)(2)–(3).
93. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,460.
94. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed.
Reg. 70,921, 70,923 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500).
95. Id.
96. Id. HUD’s standard applies equally to private and public defendants. See
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,476.
97. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11,476 (“[T]he rule does not establish a new form of liability, but instead serves
to formalize by regulation a standard that has been applied for decades, while providing
nationwide uniformity of application.”).
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that the agency is charged with administering.98 This does not mean that
courts must automatically apply any rule that an agency creates: under the
Administrative Procedure Act99 (APA), courts must set aside agency action
that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”100 This judicial review of agency action is governed
by the two-step Chevron deference test.101
The basic two-step test is this: If the reviewing court is reviewing an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with
administering, then the court must first ask “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue,” that is, whether the statute is “silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” (Step One).102 If the
statute speaks directly to the specific issue at hand, that is the end of the
inquiry, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”103
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific question
at issue, the court must then ask “whether the agency’s answer [or
interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute” (Step
Two).104 At Step Two, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation if
it is “reasonable,” and the court may not substitute its own interpretation for
that of the agency.105
Thus, when a court reviews HUD’s disparate impact rule, it must ask:
(1) whether Congress spoke directly to the precise issue of whether
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, and (2) if not,
whether HUD’s interpretation of the FHA as allowing such claims is
reasonable.106
C. A Side Note on the Fair Housing Act’s Legislative History
This section briefly explains the legislative history of the FHA.
Generally speaking, for at least the past twenty-five years, courts have been
reluctant to use legislative history to decipher the meaning of the text of a
98. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
100. Id.
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the
Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 706 (2014) (stating
that Chevron established the two-step Chevron deference test).
102. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 843.
105. Id. at 842–44.
106. See Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL
4377570, at *21, 24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (giving Chevron deference to HUD’s burdenshifting framework but holding that HUD’s application of the rule to the insurance industry
without adequate explanation was arbitrary and capricious, and remanding to HUD for
further explanation). But see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966
(RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (applying Chevron to HUD’s
disparate impact rule and concluding that the rule failed at Step One, and finding, moreover,
that HUD’s entire disparate impact rule was arbitrary and capricious).
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statute.107 For reasons discussed below, legislative history seems even less
desirable as a tool to determine the meaning of the FHA.108 However,
many courts and practitioners continue to turn to the legislative history of
the FHA as a thumb on the scale to determine legislative intent.109
The FHA was introduced as a floor amendment to the Civil Rights Act of
1968 after the publication of the Kerner Report on civil unrest in urban
areas and immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.110 Because the FHA was passed as a floor amendment, it lacks
“committee reports and other documents usually accompanying
congressional enactments.”111
For example, in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,112 the Third Circuit
recognized that Congress’s intent regarding the availability of disparate
impact claims under the FHA was difficult to discern from its legislative
history because the legislative history is “sketchy.”113
Nonetheless, the court buttressed its statutory analysis of the FHA by
stating that while the Senators debated the FHA on the floor, one senator
“introduced an amendment that would have required proof of
discriminatory intent to succeed in establishing a Title VIII claim,” but the
legislators ultimately rejected this bill.114 Thus, the Rizzo court seemed to
infer that Congress, by rejecting the proposed amendment, had in some
form condoned the disparate impact standard under the FHA.115
107. See 2 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 158–60, 163–67 (Foundation Press 2013). In discussing the controversy over
the use of legislative history to determine the meaning of a statute, the authors note that
“over the last quarter-century the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals have
reduced their reliance on legislative history . . . and have placed greater emphasis on the text
and on sources of semantic meaning, like dictionaries.” Id. at 163–64. But cf., e.g., Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Because ambiguity is apparently in the eye of the beholder, I remain convinced that it is
unwise to treat the ambiguity vel non of a statute as determinative of whether legislative
history is consulted.”).
108. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (stating that “[t]he
legislative history of the [Fair Housing] Act is not too helpful”); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he legislative history of Title VIII is somewhat
sketchy.”); Mahoney, supra note 47, at 436 n.108 (“Because there is so little of use in the
legislative history, courts hardly ever advert to it in construing the FHA.”); Oliveri, supra
note 25, at 25–26 (discussing why “looking to legislative history in interpreting the FHA is
problematic”).
109. Cf. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 (citing the FHA’s legislative history to buttress its
statutory analysis); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,476 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500)
(“The legislative history of the Act informs HUD’s interpretation.”); Brief for Respondent at
2–12, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., No. 13-1371
(Dec. 17, 2014), 2014 WL 7242817 (providing extensive discussion of the legislative history
of the FHA).
110. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.29; supra Part I.A.1.
111. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.29.
112. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 147.
114. Id.
115. Cf. id. (calling the introduction and subsequent rejection of the proposed amendment
“significant”).
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II. A “DERELICT ON THE WATERS OF THE LAW”?:
WHY THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
ARE COGNIZABLE UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
AND WHAT HUD’S GOT TO DO WITH IT
Part II begins by discussing the three different cases in which the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question of whether disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. This part explains why the
first two cases settled before oral arguments and why the case currently
before the court is unlikely to settle.
Next, Part II describes three of the original circuit court cases to hold that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. This part explains
the reasoning behind each of these cases, tracing the reasoning back along
two lines of thought: disparate impact liability under the Equal Protection
Clause and under Title VII. It then explains how these early cases each
relied upon an analogy to equal protection cases and why such an analogy is
no longer valid. This part goes on to demonstrate that the survival of the
disparate impact standard under the FHA must rely on the text of the FHA
itself because the Supreme Court has invalidated the equal protection line of
analysis.
Part II then summarizes the reasoning of recent Supreme Court decisions
that analyzed language in other civil rights statutes that is similar to the
FHA’s text and explains how this reasoning might affect future analyses of
the text of the FHA. Finally, this part discusses how federal courts have
applied Chevron to the HUD disparate impact rule and how the recent
Supreme Court decisions have affected the Chevron analysis in one of these
decisions.
A. Third Time’s the Charm? The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari on the
Question of Whether the FHA Authorizes Disparate Impact Liability
The Supreme Court first granted certiorari on the question of whether
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA in Gallagher v.
Magner.116 In Gallagher, a number of landlords who owned or formerly
owned multi-family housing buildings—most of which were occupied
primarily by low-income tenants—sued the city of St. Paul, Minnesota for
unequal enforcement of housing codes, alleging violations of the FHA117
for both disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of race and
ethnicity.118 The director of St. Paul’s Department of Neighborhood
Housing and Property Improvement specifically increased housing code
enforcement on rental properties to raise revenue and “for the sake of the
neighborhood.”119 The district court dismissed both claims, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit.120 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012).
Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 830.
Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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dismissal of the disparate treatment claim121 but reversed and remanded the
disparate impact claim to the district court, because St. Paul’s unequal
enforcement of the housing code made housing unavailable or more
expensive for a disproportionately large number of African American
residents compared to white residents.122
St. Paul appealed from the remand on the disparate impact claim and
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on two questions:
1. Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?
2. If such claims are cognizable, should they be analyzed under the
burden-shifting approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test
used by four circuits, under a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by
some other test?123

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first question.124
However, the city withdrew its petition,125 and the Supreme Court never
heard oral arguments on Gallagher.126 Allegedly, at the request of the
Obama Administration,127 St. Paul agreed to withdraw its petition in
exchange for the Department of Justice declining to intervene in a civil
fraud suit alleging that St. Paul had defrauded the federal government of
millions of dollars in community development funds.128
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this question a second time in
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly.129
In Mt. Holly, the Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey had created a
redevelopment plan known as “the Gardens.”130 The Gardens was the only
neighborhood in all of Mount Holly that was mostly comprised of
minorities,131 and the 2000 census classified nearly all residents of the
Gardens as “low income,” with most being classified as “very low” or
“extremely low” income.132 The redevelopment plan called for the
demolition of all of the housing then in place, and the replacement of the
121. Id. at 831–33, 845. One plaintiff was able to point to specific racially derogatory
comments made by code enforcement officers and police officers when visiting his property,
but the plaintiffs failed to bring these comments to the attention of the trial judge. Id. at 832.
122. Id. at 837–38, 845.
123. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct.
548 (2012) (No. 10-1032).
124. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548.
125. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (dismissing writ of certiorari).
126. See, e.g., Trevor Burrus, How Mischievous Obama Administration Officials Scuttled
an Important Supreme Court Case, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trevorburrus/2013/09/02/how-mischievous-obamaadministration-officials-scuttled-an-important-supreme-court-case/.
127. See Stohr, supra note 3; cf. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM,
113TH CONG., ET AL., DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO WITH ST. PAUL: HOW ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL THOMAS PEREZ MANIPULATED JUSTICE AND IGNORED THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2013)
[hereinafter DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO].
128. DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO, supra note 127, at 1.
129. 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824, cert. dismissed, 134 S.
Ct. 636 (2013).
130. Id. at 379.
131. Id. at 377.
132. Id. at 378.
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houses with 520 new housing units—fifty-six of which would be deedrestricted affordable housing units, and eleven of those fifty-six to be
offered on a priority basis for current residents.133 Relocation funds of up
to $7,500 per family were authorized, but most could not afford to live in
the Township of Mount Holly any longer.134 The township began to
acquire and demolish houses in the area in 2008 and, by summer of 2009,
the township had demolished nearly 200 buildings, with even more being
left vacant or severely damaged by the demolition process.135
In May 2008, an association of the Gardens’ residents filed suit in federal
court, alleging, among other things, violations of the FHA because of the
disproportionate negative effect that the redevelopment plan had on persons
of color.136 On appeal from a grant of summary judgment for the defendant
township, the Third Circuit concluded that the residents had made a prima
facie case and deserved to have their claims heard on the merits.137
The township petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on
the same two questions138 that were presented in Gallagher.139 Again, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari only to the first: whether disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA.140
However, this case also settled before oral arguments could be heard, this
time allegedly at the behest of civil rights advocacy groups.141 Again, the
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari and the question remained
unanswered.142
This issue is before the Supreme Court again in a 2014 case from the
Fifth Circuit, Inclusive Communities. In this case, the nonprofit community
group Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) sued the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) for “maintaining and
perpetuating segregated housing patterns” through its distribution of lowincome housing tax credits (LIHTCs).143 The LIHTC program is a federal
tax credit program administered by state agencies, which gives tax credits to
developers of affordable housing.144 LIHTCs are distributed by TDHCA to
developers through a competitive program, and these credits can be sold off
by the developer to finance low-income housing projects.145 ICP alleges
133. Id. at 379.
134. Id. at 380.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 380–81.
137. Id. at 385.
138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
139. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Mt. Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824.
140. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioner at i, Mt. Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824.
141. Cf. Adam Liptak, Housing Case Is Settled Before It Goes to Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at A18; Stohr, supra note 3 (implying that civil rights groups were
behind the settlement).
142. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
636 (2013) (dismissing writ of certiorari).
143. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275,
278 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
144. See I.R.C. § 42 (2012); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 277.
145. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 277.
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that TDHCA has granted LIHTCs to developers for projects in minorityconcentrated neighborhoods at a disproportionate rate and denied LIHTCs
in predominately white neighborhoods at a disproportionate rate, thereby
creating a concentration of low-income housing in minority-concentrated
neighborhoods and maintaining patterns of segregation.146
The district court held in favor of ICP on the FHA disparate impact
claim,147 and TDHCA appealed.148 On appeal, the primary question was
which standard should be applied in disparate impact claims under the
FHA.149 The district court applied the standard found in Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,150 which places the burden on the
defendant to “(1) justify [its] actions with a compelling governmental
interest and (2) prove that there were no less discriminatory alternatives.”151
However, between the time that the district court decided the case and the
time that the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal, HUD finalized its disparate
impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, which establishes that the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing less discriminatory alternatives.152 The Fifth Circuit
declined to follow Huntington Beach and instead applied the test in
§ 100.500.153
Again, the defendants appealed, but this time petitioning the Supreme
Court for certiorari on the same two questions presented in Gallagher and
Mt. Holly.154 Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first
question: whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA.155
This time, it seems unlikely that the case will settle.156 Michael Daniel, a
lawyer for ICP, stated that ICP has no intention of withdrawing the
complaint, and that ICP “can make its case before the Supreme Court.”157
B. How We Got to Where We Are Today:
An Analysis of the Validity of the Underlying Reasoning
in Early FHA Disparate Impact Cases
This section discusses in detail the reasoning behind the first three federal
circuit court decisions to address the question of whether disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA. This section then explains how the
survival of the disparate impact standard under the FHA must rest on the
146. Id. at 278.
147. Id. at 276.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
151. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 279 (citing Huntington Branch, 822 F.2d at
939).
152. See supra Part I.B.1.
153. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 747 F.3d at 282–83.
154. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners at i, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 46.
156. Stohr, supra note 3.
157. Id.
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text of the statute itself—something that can be demonstrated with close
textual analysis and analogies to the text of employment discrimination
statutes that have elsewhere been held to authorize disparate impact claims.
1. Early Disparate Impact Decisions Under the FHA Relied
on an Invalid Legal Theory Under the Equal Protection Clause
In 1974, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. City of Black
Jack,158 the first federal circuit court case to impose liability under the FHA
based solely on a theory of disparate impact.159 The facts underlying Black
Jack are typical of what Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre describes as a
“housing barrier” case,160 or a case in which the challenged practice erects a
barrier to integrating neighborhoods.161 In Black Jack, a coalition of
residents in a formerly unincorporated neighborhood petitioned St. Louis
county for incorporation after learning that a low-income housing complex
had been approved for an undeveloped plot of land in the neighborhood.162
The residents succeeded in incorporating the neighborhood and founded the
City of Black Jack—a city that was ninety-nine percent white, in stark
contrast to surrounding neighborhoods in the St. Louis metropolitan area.163
Within one week after the City of Black Jack’s municipal authority went
into effect, the city began hearings on a new zoning ordinance that would
prohibit any new multifamily dwellings from being built within the city’s
limits and would make any then-existing multifamily dwellings
“nonconforming.”164 Within one month from the start of the hearings, the
city council of Black Jack approved and enacted the ordinance.165
The United States sued the City of Black Jack, alleging both disparate
treatment and disparate impact violations under the FHA.166 The district
court found that the plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts to overcome
their burden of persuasion for either claim, but the Eighth Circuit reversed
and remanded with respect to the disparate impact claim and ordered the
district court to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the zoning
ordinance.167
The Eighth Circuit made two pertinent analytical choices in Black Jack:
(1) it established the prima facie framework applied in FHA disparate
impact claims,168 and (2) it relied directly on equal protection precedent in

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
1974).
167.
168.

508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
See Mahoney, supra note 47, at 427–28; Schneider, supra note 19, at 558.
See Seicshnaydre, supra note 19, at 365.
See id. at 361.
Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1182.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.
See generally United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mo.
Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188.
Id. at 1184.
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holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA without
any statutory analysis.169
The Black Jack court’s conclusion that the “burden of proof in [FHA]
cases is governed by the concept of the ‘prima facie case’”170 can be traced
indirectly to Title VII case law. The two cases the court cites for its
conclusion are Griggs171 and Williams v. Matthews Co.172
The basic reasoning in Williams is that, because the concept of the prima
facie case governs in disparate treatment claims under Title VII,173 so too
should it govern actions under the FHA.174 In Williams, the Eighth Circuit
adopted the disparate treatment burden-shifting regime directly from the
Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas Corp.175
Six months later, the Eighth Circuit decided Black Jack and cited to
Williams for the proposition that the burden of proof in FHA cases is
governed by the concept of the prima facie case.176 However, instead of
citing Griggs177 for the proposition that a prima facie case can be
established with a showing of a disparate impact—which would have
paralleled the reasoning in Williams—it instead cited to a number of equal
protection cases that were brought in the context of fair housing.178
The Black Jack court relied directly on equal protection precedent in
finding disparate impact liability under the FHA.179 As Peter E. Mahoney
notes in his article: “The [equal protection] cases were not referred to by
analogy. The Court based its holding squarely upon them, without any
attempt to explain the leap from constitutional to statutory bases.”180 To
understand why the court relied solely on equal protection cases while
simultaneously eschewing statutory analysis of the FHA,181 one should note

169. Id. at 1184–87; Mahoney supra note 47, at 428–29 & 428 n.65 (collecting cases
upon which the Black Jack court relied).
170. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826
(8th Cir. 1974)).
171. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
172. 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
173. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
174. See Williams, 499 F.2d at 826 (“We think that the concept of the ‘prima facie case’
applies to discrimination in housing as much as to discrimination in other areas of life.”
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973))).
175. See supra notes 83–84; see also Williams, 499 F.2d at 827 (adopting prima facie
case framework from McDonell Douglas and applying it to FHA disparate treatment claim).
176. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
177. This may be explained simply by the fact that Griggs makes no mention of the prima
facie case. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
178. See Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–85; infra note 182.
179. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–87; see also Mahoney supra note 47, at 428–29 & 428
n.65 (collecting cases upon which the Black Jack court relied).
180. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429 n.71.
181. Id. at 428. “Indeed, Black Jack lacks any substantive analysis of the language of the
FHA or of the employment law disparate impact cases, focusing instead on a balancing test
derived wholly from the constitutional cases.” Id.; accord Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey P.
Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate Impact Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher: An
Opportunity to Return to the Primacy of the Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 125–26
(2012); Andrew L. Sandler & Kirk D. Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair Lending: A Theory
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that all of the equal protection cases upon which the Black Jack court relied
arose in the housing context, although only some included an FHA
claim.182
However, complete reliance on these cases as direct authority turned out
to be problematic.183 Several years later, in Washington v. Davis, the
Supreme Court directly overturned three of the cases relied upon in Black
Jack and overturned the rest of the cases relied upon in Black Jack by
implication.184 In Davis, the Court rejected a disparate impact standard of
liability under the Equal Protection Clause in the context of employment
discrimination.185 The next year—in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.186—the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its rejection of disparate impact liability under the Equal
Protection Clause but this time specifically in the fair housing context.187
Arlington Heights came to the Supreme Court on appeal from Arlington
Heights I,188 in which the Seventh Circuit held that the Village of Arlington
Heights’s refusal to rezone property sought to be developed by the plaintiff
had a disparate impact on people of color, and therefore violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.189 Citing Washington v.
Davis, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that disparate impact claims
are not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.190

Without a Basis & the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 18, 18 (2014).
182. Many of the cases that the Black Jack court relied on lacked a FHA component or
the courts gave the FHA claims cursory treatment. See United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous.
Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusal by
municipality to offer sewer services to housing project occupied mostly by African
Americans and Hispanic residents; FHA claim given cursory treatment); Hawkins v. Town
of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971) (discriminatory impact in availability of
municipal services; no FHA component), aff’d en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1970) (discriminatory
impact of zoning ordinances; FHA claim brought, but not discussed, and FHA claim not
decided); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970) (discriminatory
impact of zone change; no FHA component or claim); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 923 (2d Cir. 1968) (discriminatory impact of
redevelopment project; no FHA claim); Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 362
F. Supp. 651, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discriminatory effect analysis under Equal Protection
Clause for failed city housing project; FHA claim given cursory treatment), aff’d, 507 F.2d
1065 (2d Cir. 1974); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1177, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(revocation of public housing building permits denied plaintiffs equal protection; no FHA
claim, and no FHA analysis, but FHA said to be violated because of a denial of equal
protection).
183. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 125–27; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429–
31; Sandler & Jensen, supra note 181, at 18.
184. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429–30.
185. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
186. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
187. See id. at 264–65, 268; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 430.
188. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights I), 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
189. Id. at 415.
190. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–65.
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Therefore, within a few short years of the Black Jack decision, the
Supreme Court not only invalidated the majority of the law on which the
Black Jack decision relied, but also held that this authority remained invalid
within the specific context of fair housing. As Mahoney succinctly states:
“The Supreme Court’s unmistakable rejection of the disparate impact
theory of equal protection liability cut Black Jack from its constitutional
moorings, apparently rendering its holding, within eighteen months, a
‘derelict on the waters of the law.’”191
The Seventh Circuit did not decide the FHA claim in Arlington Heights
I.192 Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the
FHA authorized disparate impact liability.193 Instead, on remand, and the
Seventh Circuit, in Arlington Heights II,194 once again found that the
Village of Arlington Heights had engaged in discrimination under a theory
of disparate impact, but this time, it found that Arlington Heights was liable
under section 804(a) of the FHA.195
2. Arlington Heights II and Rizzo: A Mixed Bag
Along with Black Jack, two subsequent cases decided in 1977, Arlington
Heights II and Rizzo, are sometimes discussed as the three “original FHA
disparate impact cases.”196 Unlike the Black Jack court, the Arlington
Heights II court and the Rizzo court engaged in a statutory analysis of
section 804(a).197 Both cases display similar reasoning198 and, thus, will be
discussed together.
In Rizzo, the City of Philadelphia displaced a number of African
American families after it condemned and razed a portion of a five-block
radius in the majority-white community of Whitman.199 The Philadelphia
Housing Authority had planned to build a public housing complex on that
site, but after facing community resistance, the mayor and the city’s
agencies withdrew that plan even after the developer had begun
construction.200 Resident Advisory Board, a community group that

191. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 430 (quoting Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341
U.S. 341, 356 (1951)).
192. Arlington Heights I, 517 F.2d 409; see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271
(referring to the Seventh Circuit’s “unorthodox” resolution of the case based on the
constitutional claim and not the statutory claim); Mahoney, supra note 47, at 432 (referring
to the case on appeal as having an “inverted procedural status”).
193. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271.
194. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
195. Id. at 1288.
196. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128; see also Mahoney, supra note 47, at 427–
439 (referring to Black Jack, Arlington Heights II, and Rizzo as the original cases to hold that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA).
197. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Arlington
Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288–89.
198. But cf. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 436 (stating that Rizzo is the first circuit court
case to place “primary analytic reliance” on Title VII cases).
199. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 129–32.
200. See id. at 132, 134–36.
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supported the project, sued.201 The district court found that the city and its
mayor had intentionally discriminated against African Americans202 in
violation of the FHA and that its agencies and HUD had violated the FHA
under a disparate impact theory because of the discriminatory effect of their
actions.203 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in all respects and
clarified that the disparate impact violation occurred under section
804(a).204
Both the Rizzo and Arlington Heights II courts began their statutory
analyses by recognizing that a narrow reading of the phrase “because of
race” found in section 804(a) of the FHA could act as an obstacle to reading
the text of the FHA as authorizing disparate impact claims.205 However,
both courts opted for the broader reading of the “because of” language.206
The Arlington Heights II court reasoned that a defendant can commit an act
“because of” race “whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of
that act is to discriminate between races, regardless of . . . intent.”207
First, both courts turned to the Griggs analysis of Title VII, which
contains the same “because of [protected trait]” formulation208 found in the
FHA.209 The Arlington Heights II court read Griggs as authorizing
disparate impact liability under Title VII “in spite of the ‘because of race’
language” found in section 703(h).210 The Rizzo court also found it
significant that the presence of the same “because of” language in Title VII
was not a barrier to the Griggs Court authorizing disparate impact claims
under that Title.211
Next, both the Arlington Heights II and the Rizzo courts focused on
Griggs’s emphasis on the “broad purposes underlying [Title VII],”212 in
finding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under that Title.213
Both courts reasoned that the FHA had similarly broad remedial
purposes,214 and thus the broad purposes of the FHA were sufficient to
overcome the obstacle that the “because of” language presented.215
Therefore, both the Arlington Heights II court and the Rizzo court
emphasized the similarities between the remedial purposes of both Title VII

201. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
202. See id. at 1025 (finding that the city had intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiffs, the district court pointed to the fact that Rizzo “considered public housing to be
Black housing and took a stand against placing such housing in White neighborhoods”).
203. Id. at 1022–24, 1026.
204. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 130. The Third Circuit also did not “find it necessary to
determine precisely which provision of Title VII the City violated.” Id. at 140 n.21.
205. Id. at 146; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977).
206. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 146–47; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288.
207. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288.
208. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
209. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289.
210. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289.
211. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147.
212. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289 n.6.
213. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289.
214. See infra notes 263–66.
215. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289.

2015]

DEFERRING TO HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE

2071

and the FHA in overcoming statutory language that might otherwise point
to liability only for intentional discrimination.216
However, both the Arlington Heights II and the Rizzo courts buttressed
their reasoning by citing “a number of courts [that agree].”217 These
agreeing courts did not rely so much on a statutory analysis of the FHA or
an analogy to Title VII but instead tended to rely upon equal protection
cases or FHA disparate treatment cases.218 Of the four cases that the
Arlington Heights II court cited, two relied on equal protection disparate
impact cases,219 one was a disparate treatment FHA case,220 and the fourth
was Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo221 while it was still in the district
court, which relied heavily on an equal protection analysis adopted from
Black Jack.222 The Rizzo court cited the exact same cases that the Arlington
Heights II court cited, except, where Arlington Heights II cited Rizzo in the
district court, Rizzo cited to Arlington Heights II.223 Accordingly, some
commentators have argued that the reasoning in both Arlington Heights II
and Rizzo is weakened by these citations, or at least that such citations add
little to the analysis.224
Despite this apparent logical flaw in Black Jack, Arlington Heights II,
and Rizzo, many modern courts continue to cite these cases as authoritative
or persuasive precedent for the conclusion that the FHA authorizes
disparate impact claims.225 For example, in Inclusive Communities—the
FHA disparate impact case now before the Supreme Court—the Fifth
Circuit cited eight different cases in support of the determination that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Act.226 One of these cases
is Arlington Heights II.227 Of the seven other cases, six cite Arlington
Heights II, five cite Rizzo, and three cite Black Jack as support for applying
216. But cf. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 433, 436 (stating that Arlington Heights II relied
mostly on equal protection cases and Rizzo relied mostly on a Title VII analogy).
217. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; see also Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.31.
218. See infra notes 219–23; accord Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128 (noting
that the Rizzo court did not rely solely on its statutory analysis and analogy to Title VII, but
also relied on a number of cases grounded in an equal protection analogy); Mahoney, supra
note 47, at 433 (noting that Arlington Heights II “buttressed its statutory disparate impact
holding” by citing equal protection cases).
219. See Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding that the City of Lackawanna had prevented the plaintiffs from exercising
their “constitutional right of ‘freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of
property rights’” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948))). The Supreme Court
explicitly overturned Kennedy Park Homes in Arlington Heights. See Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 n.16 (1977); Mahoney, supra note
47, at 433.
220. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976).
221. 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
222. See id. at 1022; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 433.
223. See Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.31 (citing Arlington Heights II, Smith, Black Jack, and
Kennedy Park Homes).
224. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 125; Mahoney, supra note 47, at 429.
225. See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 128–29.
226. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275, 280 n.4 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
227. Id.
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the disparate impact standard.228 Each case, except for one, cites at least
two of the three, and one cites all three.229
C. Recent Supreme Court Cases Which Arguably Undermine
Reading the Text of the FHA As Authorizing Disparate Impact Claims
Some argue that the reasoning in Arlington Heights II and Rizzo—insofar
as they rely on the text of the FHA and an analogy to Title VII—also has
been effectively rejected by the Supreme Court in a number of recent
cases.230 First, this section explains that the Supreme Court interprets
statutes that have the same language and similar purposes as having a
consistent meaning. Next, this section discusses the Supreme Court’s
recent interpretation of the key language in several relevant civil rights
statutes: the “otherwise adversely affect” language in Title VII and the Age
(ADEA);
and
the
Discrimination
in
Employment
Act231
discriminate/adversely affect “because of” a protected trait language in the
same statutes. Finally, this section lays out how scholars and courts have
attempted to apply these recent Supreme Court provisions to arguably
similar provisions in the FHA.
Smith v. City of Jackson232 is often cited as being the first Supreme Court
case to seriously call into question the analogies between the FHA and Title
VII.233 Smith is a four-to-one-to-three plurality decision in which the Court
held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.234 In
doing so, the Smith Court analyzed the language in section 4(a)(1) and
228. See Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381,
384 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rizzo and Black Jack); Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 833,
836 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012) (citing Arlington Heights II and Black Jack); Graoch Assocs. #33, L. P. v.
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 383 & n.3 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing Arlington Height II and Rizzo); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207
F.3d 43, 49 & nn.3–4 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Arlington Heights II and Rizzo); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citing Arlington Heights II and Rizzo); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Arlington Heights II, Black Jack, and Rizzo);
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Arlington Heights
II).
229. See supra note 228.
230. See infra Part II.C.2.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
232. 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (plurality opinion).
233. Cf. Michael G. Allen, Jamie L. Crook & John P. Relman, Assessing HUD’s
Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 157
(2014) (stating that the decision in Smith has “reignited” challenges to the disparate impact
standard under the FHA, particularly by attempting to draw distinctions between the
language of Title VII and ADEA on one side and the FHA on the other); Jensen & Naimon,
supra note 181, at 100 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Smith
“makes clear that the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHA do not permit disparate
impact claims”). But cf. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 149 & n.156 (2014) (arguing that the “otherwise make
unavailable or deny” language found in the FHA establishes a “results test,” and that the
holding in Smith supports this view).
234. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this
case. Id.
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(a)(2) of the ADEA in the context of an EEOC regulation that arguably
created a disparate impact standard under section 4(a).235
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court for Parts I, II, and IV,
in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia joined.236 The
plurality’s opinion in Part III analyzes the text of section 4(a)(1) and (a)(2),
and it focuses largely on the Griggs Court’s interpretation of Title VII.237
The plurality makes clear that the reason that the reading in Griggs is
correct is because section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful to “otherwise
adversely affect” an individual’s employment status because of a protected
trait—language that section 703(a)(1) does not contain.238
Justice Scalia did not join Part III of the opinion, but wrote in his
concurrence that although he “agree[s] with all of the Court’s reasoning” as
to Part III, he would prefer to defer to the EEOC’s disparate impact rule
under a Chevron analysis.239
The dissent, in which three Justices joined, also analyzed the text of the
statute but reached a different conclusion.240 The dissent agreed that the
language in section 4(a)(1) does not authorize disparate impact claims, but
the dissent also argued that section 4(a)(2) does not support such claims
either.241
The dissent in Smith reasoned that the language “because of [protected
trait]” was the decisive language in the statute, and that this language forced
a reading of the statute that only authorizes disparate treatment claims.242
Citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary from 1961, Justice
O’Connor argued that “because of” plainly means to act “by reason of” or
“on account of” an individual’s age, and that this inescapably premises
liability under the ADEA on a defendant’s discriminatory intent.243 Just as
parallel language should be read consistently among different titles of the
United States Code,244 Justice O’Connor argued that the parallel use of the
“because of” language in section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) should be read as
having the same meaning.245 She argued that the language “because of” is
235. See id.at 243–47 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the EEOC rule created a
disparate impact standard under section 4(a)(2)). But see id. at 263–66 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the EEOC rule in question does not apply to section 4(a)). See
infra note 261 and accompanying text for the full text of the relevant portions of the parallel
provisions of Title VII. The text of these provisions of Title VII is identical to the provisions
of the ADEA discussed here, except substitute “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
with “age,” and omit “or applicants for employment.” Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
236. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 229 (plurality opinion).
237. See id. at 233–34.
238. See id. at 245–46 (Scalia, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 243.
240. See id. 247–68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 248–51.
242. See id. at 250.
243. Id. at 249.
244. Cf. id. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that, because ADEA was
derived in haec verba from Title VII, the parallel provisions of these two statutory schemes
should be read to have meanings consistent with each other).
245. See id. at 249–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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“precisely the same” in both section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2), and that to read
one subsection as foreclosing disparate impact claims, and the other as
authorizing them, would give the words in the text different meanings.246 If
Justice O’Connor’s reading of the plain meaning of “because of” is correct,
this could have major implications for the interpretation of the FHA, which
contains the “because of” language, but does not contain the exact
“otherwise adversely affect”247 language thought to redeem disparate
impact claims under Title VII and the ADEA.248
Justice O’Connor’s reading of the “because of” language in her Smith
dissent has received support from some of the Court’s subsequent decisions,
perhaps most notably in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.249
Gross is a five-to-four decision in which the Court decided that the
disparate treatment provision of the ADEA required that age be a but-for
cause of the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action.250
This holding itself does not actually affect disparate impact cases under the
FHA, but how the Court came to its conclusion is significant.
The Court began its analysis of the text by explaining that “[s]tatutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses
the legislative purpose.”251
The Court then analyzed the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “because
of.”252 The Court cited three dictionaries for the proposition that the
phrase’s plain meaning is “by reason of” or “on account of.”253 Thus,
under the disparate treatment statute, section 4(a)(1), the plain meaning of
“discriminate . . . because of age,” is that age must be the reason that an
employer decided to act—that is, age must be a but-for cause of the
action.254
The Gross Court’s interpretation of “because of” is rather narrow,255 and
it could be an indication of how narrowly the Court might interpret the plain
meaning of “because of” in the FHA when the Court decides Inclusive
Communities. As early as Arlington Heights II, courts recognized that the
“because of” language found in section 804(a)256 of the FHA, if read
narrowly, could be problematic for bringing disparate impact claims under
246. See id. at 250.
247. See infra Part II.C.2.
248. Cf. Smith, 544 U.S. at 236 (plurality opinion).
249. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
250. See id. at 176.
251. Id. at 175–76 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541
U.S. 246, 252 (2004)).
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Cf. Meghan C. Cooper, Comment, Reading Between the Lines: The Supreme
Court’s Textual Analysis of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 753, 770–72 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the ADEA’s
“because of” language overturned prior precedent and placed an “[u]nfair and [i]llogical”
burden on plaintiffs bringing ADEA claims).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
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the Act.257 This ongoing debate continues to incite rebukes and defenses of
disparate impact claims among litigants and commentators.
D. The Effect of Smith and Gross on the FHA
This section explains how Smith and Gross have already affected
interpretations of the FHA. This section also examines the opposing
viewpoints of those who argue that the decisions in Smith and Gross have
had no effect on a reading of the FHA that would authorize disparate impact
claims, versus those who argue that Smith and Gross preclude a reading of
the FHA as authorizing disparate impact claims.
As indicated above,258 it is common for commentators and courts to
argue that the text of the FHA does or does not authorize disparate impact
claims by conducting a close textual analysis of the FHA and comparing the
language of the FHA to the language of Title VII.259
A complete discussion of these provisions requires that the two statutes
be reproduced side by side, in full:
Fair Housing Act:
section 804. . . . it shall be unlawful—
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after making a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.260
Title VII:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.261

257. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. Cf. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 108 (comparing the text of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the FHA, and showing alleged presence of “disparate treatment” language);
Schneider, supra note 19, at 564–67 (comparing the language in Title VII and the ADEA to
the language in the FHA).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b).
261. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2).
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1. The Proponents’ Arguments
Proponents of the FHA disparate impact standard often argue that the
FHA and Title VII are sufficiently similar in language and structure to
warrant the conclusion that the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims.262
This argument tends to begin with a statement of the FHA’s purpose: “It
is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”263 This purpose
is often read as giving the FHA’s language a generous construction, and the
FHA as a whole, a “‘broad and inclusive’ compass.”264 Recall that both the
Rizzo and Arlington Heights II courts reasoned that the broad remedial
purposes of the FHA were sufficient to overcome the argument that certain
language in the FHA should be read narrowly to preclude disparate impact
claims.265
Thus, when the FHA states that it is unlawful to “otherwise make
unavailable or deny” a dwelling to a person on the basis of a person’s
protected trait, courts and commentators read this language broadly as
making acts with a discriminatory effect unlawful.266
This language, the argument goes, is sufficiently similar to the language
“otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee”267 in section
703(a)(2) of Title VII to conclude that the FHA also authorizes disparate
impact claims.268 As Part II.B discusses, the Smith Court confirmed that it
is this language in section 703(a)(2) that gives rise to disparate impact
liability.
It is argued that both the “otherwise make unavailable” language under
the FHA and the “otherwise adversely affect” language of Title VII and the
ADEA focus on the “potential discriminatory impacts of actions.”269 While
the “affects” language in Title VII and ADEA might be “more explicit”
than the language in the FHA, both focus on the unwanted effect on the
protected person.270
262. See infra notes 266–73 and accompanying text.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 3601; see also Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir.
1977); Schneider, supra note 19, at 566.
264. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (quoting
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)); see also Schneider, supra
note 19, at 566; cf. Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc. 759 F.3d 140, 158 (2d Cir. 2014) (according
the term “aggrieved person” under the FHA the broadest construction “as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution” (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209)).
265. See supra Part II.A.2.
266. See Johnson, supra note 233, at 149 & n.156 (arguing that the “otherwise make
unavailable or deny” language found in the FHA establishes a “results test”); Schneider,
supra note 19 at 566; cf. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, 134
S. Ct. 636 (2013) (stating that a dwelling can be made otherwise unavailable to certain
persons by actions that limit the availability of affordable housing).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
268. See supra note 266.
269. Schneider, supra note 19, at 566.
270. Id.; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,466 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.500).

2015]

DEFERRING TO HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE

2077

Further, Professor Valerie Schneider argues that the language “adversely
affect” simply would not make sense in the housing context:
[T]he language of the Fair Housing Act would have been strange indeed if
Congress had made it illegal to “adversely affect” an individual’s “status”
as a potential homeowner or renter. . . .
[R]eading disparate impact analysis into Title VII and the ADEA
simply because those statutes contain the word “affect” while the Fair
Housing Act omits that word in favor of more descriptive language . . . is
the most strained reading possible of the acts. Indeed, no court has held
that disparate impact claims must be based on the “adversely affect”
phrase alone.271

Thus, the difference in language between the FHA and Title VII is a
product of necessarily different drafting techniques due to the subject matter
being regulated and not based on different legislative intent.
Proponents also address the narrow reading of the “because of” language
found in the FHA. The basic argument regarding this language is that a
narrow reading would be incompatible with the broad purposes of the FHA
and “effects” language discussed in the above paragraph.272 As early as
1977, in Arlington Heights II, courts recognized the possibility that the
“because of” language may be read narrowly to restrict the FHA’s
application to actions that were motivated by unlawful considerations.273
However, no circuit court or agency has found this language to be a barrier
to disparate impact claims under the FHA.274 HUD argues explicitly that
the use of the “because of” language in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII and
section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA takes any force out of the argument that the
“because of” language in the FHA requires that a defendant act with
unlawful intent in order to be liable under the FHA.275
HUD next argues that the legal definition of “discriminate”—a word
found in section 804(b) of the FHA and elsewhere—also supports an
interpretation of the FHA that authorizes disparate impact claims.276 In
HUD’s implementation of 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, it argues that
“‘[d]iscriminate’ is a term that may encompass actions that have a
271. Schneider, supra note 19, at 566.
272. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Rizzo and Arlington Heights II analysis of the
“because of” language found in the FHA); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,466 (concluding that the “because
of” language does not preclude disparate impact claims, because the same language also
appears in Title VII, section 703(a)(2), and ADEA, section 4(a)(2), which both authorize
disparate impact claims).
273. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977); accord Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977).
274. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11,462; cf. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 280 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (collecting cases
from ten circuit courts, which all have held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
the FHA).
275. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,466.
276. See infra notes 277–84.
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discriminatory effect but not a discriminatory intent.”277 For support of this
position, HUD cites two Supreme Court cases: (1) Alexander v. Choate,278
in which the Court “assum[ed] without deciding” that a statute that makes it
illegal to “subject [an individual with a disability] to discrimination”279
authorizes disparate impact claims;280 and (2) Board of Education v.
Harris,281 in which the court held that the word “discriminate” in the
Emergency School Authorization Act282 was ambiguous, and in
consideration of the Act’s purpose, policy, legislative history, and text,
could encompass a disparate impact test.283 HUD goes on to say that:
HUD’s extensive experience in administering the Fair Housing
Act . . . informs its conclusion that not only can the term “discriminate”
be interpreted to encompass discriminatory effects liability, but it must be
so interpreted in order to achieve the Act’s stated purpose to provide for
fair housing to the extent the Constitution allows.284

In addition, a quick look at the history of the legal definition of
“discrimination” as found in previous editions of Black’s Law Dictionary
shows that the definition of “discrimination” has not been static. The term
“discrimination” has been in Black’s Law Dictionary at least since its third
edition, though early versions do not explicitly define discrimination in the
civil rights context.285 The third edition defines discrimination as, “[i]n
constitutional law, the effect of a statute which confers particular privileges
on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons.”286 By the
fourth revised edition, a new definition was included in addition to the
language quoted above: “[i]n general, a failure to treat all equally;
favoritism.”287 The fifth edition added, for the first time, a definition that
explicitly refers to discrimination in the civil rights context and which also
includes disparate treatment language: “[u]nfair treatment or denial of
normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, nationality or
religion.”288 This definition stayed constant through the sixth edition.289
By the ninth edition, Black’s Law Dictionary abandoned the language “in
constitutional law” and stated that “discrimination” means:
277. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,466.
278. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
279. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
280. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299.
281. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
282. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1619 (1979).
283. Harris, 444 U.S. at 140–41.
284. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,466.
285. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (3d ed. 1933) (citing Franchise Motor Freight
Ass’n v. Seavey, 235 P. 1000, 1002 (Cal. 1925)).
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (4th revised ed. 1968) (emphasis added).
288. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). This edition also
included an explanatory note that states that “[f]ederal statutes prohibit discrimination in
employment on basis of [protected traits].” Id. (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
289. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990).
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n., (1866) 1. The effect of a law or established practice that confers
privileges on a certain class or that denies privileges to a certain class
because of race, [and other protected classes]. . . . 2. Differential
treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable
distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.290

The entry then explains different kinds of discrimination, including race
discrimination and sex discrimination.291 The ninth edition’s definition is
interesting, because it adds civil rights–specific language in the definition
that contains “effects” language and drops it from the section that contains
the disparate treatment language.292
In 2014, the tenth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary changed the
definition of “discrimination” again, keeping all of the same language
quoted from the ninth edition, but adding (as the first entry, in front of the
above-quoted language), “1. The intellectual faculty of noting differences or
similarities.”293 It also added a new subentry of interest: “direct
discrimination,” which means, “[d]ifferential treatment of a person or a
particular group of people based on race, gender, or other characteristic.”294
Finally, the tenth edition also includes another new entry, defining
“discriminatory purpose,” which is a “design or desire to restrict the rights
of a class of people, esp. a protected class.”295
2. The Opponents’ Arguments
Those who oppose the theory that disparate impact claims are cognizable
under the FHA obviously take a different approach.
First, this side of the argument tends to put a lot of weight in the Supreme
Court’s Smith v. City of Jackson decision, which reasoned that the
“otherwise adversely affect” language, found in both Title VII and the
ADEA, is the language which gives rise to disparate impact liability under
those statutes.296 The basic argument here is that for a statute to authorize
disparate impact claims, it must contain explicit “effects” language, such as
the word “affect” or “results.”297 In American Insurance Ass’n v. U.S.
Department of Housing & Urban Development, Judge Richard J. Leon
expressed that “[i]t takes hutzpah (bordering on desperation)” for HUD to
argue that the language of section 804(a) resembles the language of Title
290. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 535.
293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (10th ed. 2014).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 567.
296. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Smith Court’s reasoning); cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL 5802283, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov.
7, 2014) (“In short, Smith represents a sea change in approach to the analysis of statutory
provisions with respect to disparate-impact liability. . . .”); Jensen & Naimon, supra note
181, at 101–02.
297. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *9; Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at
104–05; cf. Schneider, supra note 19, at 544, 566 (arguing against the “textualist” position
that the “magic” word “affects” is necessary for disparate impact claims to be cognizable
under the FHA).
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VII section 703(a)(2) and ADEA section 4(a)(2), when both of these
provisions contain the “effects” language, and FHA section 804(a) does
not.298
Kirk D. Jensen and Jeffrey P. Naimon provide one of the more thorough
arguments taking this approach.299 Relying on the reasoning in Smith,
Jensen and Naimon argue that for a statute to authorize disparate impact
claims, it must use the language “otherwise adversely affect” or “results
in.”300 The authors point to five different statutes that contain this
language, each of which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as
authorizing disparate impact claims.301 They next list four statutes that
follow some form of a “discriminate . . . because of” formulation, each of
which has been held by the Supreme Court to authorize only disparate
treatment claims.302 Thus, “when a statute contains language addressing
the ‘effects’ or ‘results’ of an action, disparate impact claims under the
statute are permitted. When the statute lacks such ‘effects’ language,
disparate impact claims under the statute are prohibited.”303
Jensen and Naimon then apply this logic to the FHA.304 However, they
do not apply this test to section 804(a), the statute usually cited as the one
giving rise to disparate impact liability.305 Instead, Jensen and Naimon cite
section 805(a)306 of the FHA, which reads: “It shall be unlawful for any
person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real
estate–related transactions to discriminate against any person in making
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a
transaction, because of race . . . .”307 Thus, the FHA provision that they
analyze clearly contains the “discriminate . . . because of” formulation they
are looking for to argue that the FHA does not authorize disparate impact
claims.
Second, the opponents of FHA disparate impact liability will also look to
the “ordinary meaning” of “discriminate” to support their position. As
noted above, this approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent which
requires the interpretation of a statute to begin with the assumption that
Congress intended the words it used to have their ordinary meaning.308
The “ordinary meaning” of “discriminate,” opponents argue, is some
version of “to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or
categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.”309 The word “treatment”
298. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *9.
299. Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181.
300. Id. at 105.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 106.
303. Id. at 107.
304. Id. at 108.
305. E.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747
F.3d 275 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2012).
307. Id. § 3605(a).
308. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009).
309. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL
5802283, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
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found in the dictionary definition of discriminate leads some commentators
and at least one court to conclude that the word “discriminate” refers only
to intentional discrimination, i.e., disparate treatment claims.310
In addition to the ordinary meaning of “discriminate,” Jensen and
Naimon also look to a legal interpretation of the word, found in the five-tofour Supreme Court opinion, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education,311 which states that “‘[d]iscrimination’ is a term that covers a
wide range of intentional unequal treatment. . . .”312
Thus, opponents of the disparate impact liability standard under the FHA
use a variety of interpretive tools to support their position. All of these
tools are used to determine the “ordinary meaning” of the text of the FHA,
which, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, is the goal in any
statutory interpretation.
E. Applying Chevron to HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule
This section describes the reasoning of the only two federal judges to
apply the Chevron deference test to HUD’s disparate impact rule.
Because the HUD disparate impact rule is so new, there is a dearth of
court analysis applying the Chevron test to it. As of the end of 2014, only a
handful of cases have cited 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, most of which contain
little or no discussion of the rule at all.313 Only two district court cases
have actually applied the Chevron two-step test to § 100.500.314

DICTIONARY (1966)); Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 110 (citing to a 2006 edition of a
Random House Dictionary). Jensen and Naimon also cite to an opinion for a five-Justice
majority, written by Justice O’Connor in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544
U.S. 167, 175 (2005), and a law review article from 1983 discussing the Voting Rights Act
and the conflation of the concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact under that Act.
See Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 110 n.38 (citing James F. Blumstein, Defining and
Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the
Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 635 (1983)).
310. See supra note 309.
311. 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005).
312. Id.; see also Jensen & Naimon, supra note 181, at 106 n.38.
313. Cf. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d
275, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014) (discussing HUD’s authority to adopt
rules implementing the FHA, and adopting the burden-shifting test in § 100.500 without any
analysis of Chevron); Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *7 (vacating the rule, and
finding that the rule fails on the first step of Chevron); Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v.
Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 4377570, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014) (applying the
Chevron test and upholding the rule on the second step); Gabins v. City of Wilmington, No.
14-043-GMS, 2014 WL 1370110, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2014) (citing § 100.500 as authority
without discussion); Perdue v. City of Wilmington, No. 14-044-SLR, 2014 WL 5035938, at
*1, 3–4 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2014) (acknowledging alleged violation of § 100.500 without
discussion); MHANY Mgmt. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390, 424
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing § 100.500 in passing, and applying the burden-shifting test found in
Second Circuit case law). Although this is not an exhaustive list, it is a representative
sample of the treatment that the HUD rule has received in federal court decisions.
314. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *7; Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n of Am., 2014 WL
4377570, at *24.
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The first case to apply Chevron to HUD’s disparate impact rule was
Property Casualty Insurers Ass’n of America v. Donovan.315 In Donovan,
Judge Amy St. Eve of the Northern District of Illinois framed the question
on the first step of Chevron as whether the FHA spoke directly to how a
plaintiff should prove a discrimination claim under the FHA.316 The court
found that the FHA was silent on this question.317
The court then went on to Step Two of the Chevron analysis, which asks
whether HUD’s disparate impact rule was a reasonable interpretation of the
FHA.318 It found that HUD’s adoption of the three-step burden-shifting test
was reasonable for several reasons. First, the burden-shifting framework is
very similar to the frameworks already developed by the courts for deciding
disparate impact claims under the FHA.319 Second, the court noted that the
burden-shifting test adopted by HUD and the burden-shifting test adopted
by Congress in Title VII, are similar and that “[c]ourts have repeatedly
turned to Title VII precedent for guidance evaluating disparate impact
liability under the FHA (Title VIII) and vice versa.”320 Third, HUD’s rule
was a “reasonable accommodation of the competing interests at stake,” that
is, the interest of plaintiffs and the government in eliminating
discriminatory housing practices and the interest of defendants in avoiding
frivolous litigation.321
The next case to apply the Chevron two-step test to § 100.500 was
American Insurance Ass’n. In this instance, Judge Leon of the D.C. District
Court found that the HUD rule failed the Chevron test at Step One, because
the FHA “unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.”322
Much of this argument already has been laid out in Part II.C.2, so only a
brief reiteration and a short supplement to the argument is required to show
how this reasoning is applied in the Chevron test.
Judge Leon began his analysis by stating that Smith “made clear” that a
statute does not authorize disparate impact claims unless there is “clear
language to that effect.”323
He then turned to the dictionary meaning of a handful of words found in
the section 804(a) of the FHA, as defined by a 1966 edition of Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary.324 Each definition is important and is
analyzed further in Part III of this Note.325 He defined “refuse” as “to show

315. Cf. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n of Am., 2014 WL 4377570, at *24.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *25.
320. Id. (citing Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir.
2000)).
321. Id.
322. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 13-00966 (RJL), 2014 WL
5802283, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014).
323. Id. (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005)).
324. Id. at *8; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S THIRD].
325. See infra Part III.B.
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or express a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.”326 He then
defined “make,” found in the phrase “otherwise make unavailable or
deny,”327 as “‘to produce as a result of action, effort, or behavior’ or ‘to
cause to happen to or be experienced by someone.’”328 “Deny” in the last
phrase means “‘to refuse to grant’ or ‘to turn down or give a negative
answer to.’”329 Finally, “discriminate” is given very much the same
meaning described above,330 which is essentially to treat persons differently
on a categorical basis, without regard to merit.331
Judge Leon reasoned that the definitions of these words—“refuse,”
“make,” “deny,” and “discriminate”—all point to requiring a potential
defendant to take intentional discriminatory actions.332
Next, Judge Leon pointed to the FHA’s lack of the “effects” language
that Title VII and the ADEA include.333 The absence of the clear “effects”
language, mixed with the “because of race” formulation334 found in the
FHA, also led Judge Leon to conclude that the provisions found in the FHA
do not resemble the disparate impact provisions of Title VII and the
ADEA.335 Not only is the language in section 804(a) different from the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, but “[t]he statutory
language in [section 804(a)] is materially identical to the statutory language
used in the disparate-treatment prohibitions in Title VII and the ADEA.”336
For these reasons, Judge Leon reasoned that Congress, when it wrote the
FHA, spoke directly on the issue of whether disparate impact claims could
be brought under the Act.337 He concluded that Congress explicitly
precluded such claims by the plain language of the statute.338
It should be noted that Judges St. Eve and Leon asked slightly different
questions during their Chevron analyses. On Step One of Chevron, Judge
St. Eve asked in Donovan whether the FHA spoke directly to how a
plaintiff should prove his or her discrimination claim.339 Judge Leon, on
the other hand, asked the narrower question—and the one that is before the
Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities—that is, whether the FHA spoke
326. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *8 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note
324).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
328. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *8 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note
324).
329. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 324).
330. See supra note 309.
331. See supra note 309. It should be noted that Judge Leon cited § 3604(a) as the source
of the word “discriminate,” but that this word does not appear in that subsection, but instead
appears in § 3604(b). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b); Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *8.
332. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *8. For a critique of the reasoning in this case,
see infra Part III.B.
333. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.2.
334. See supra Part II.C.2.
335. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *8–9.
336. Id. at *9.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, 2014 WL 4377570, at *24
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014).
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directly to the issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable
under the Act.340
III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT HAS NO (ORDINARY) MEANING:
WHY THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO HUD’S INTERPRETATION
Part III of this Note argues that HUD’s disparate impact rule should be
upheld under a Chevron analysis, at least as it pertains to section 804(a)
and (b) of the FHA, because: (1) the text of the FHA is silent as to the
availability of disparate impact claims and (2) a reading of the FHA that
authorizes disparate impact claims is reasonable.
To support this conclusion, this part first argues that judicial precedent
alone cannot be relied upon to support such a reading, because many early
cases relied upon constitutional equal protection disparate impact cases that
were invalidated or abrogated by the Supreme Court. Many modern cases
continue to cite these early cases as support for the conclusion that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, weakening the foundation of
this claim.
Next, Part III argues that the text of the FHA is silent or ambiguous as to
the availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA, and thus, HUD’s
disparate impact rule passes Chevron Step One. This part reaches this
conclusion by reviewing the reasoning for and against disparate impact
liability under the FHA and ultimately concludes that neither side of the
argument is wholly satisfactory. Finally, this part argues that under
Chevron Step Two, HUD’s disparate impact rule is a reasonable
interpretation of the Act.
A. A “Derelict on the Waters of the Law”
In spite of forty years of nearly unanimous judicial precedent supporting
a disparate impact standard under the FHA, this precedent alone is not
sufficient to definitively say that the disparate impact standard should be
allowed under the Act. This is true for two compelling reasons: (1) the
heavy reliance of early FHA disparate impact cases on invalid equal
protection precedent341 and (2) a lack of statutory analysis in these early
cases.342 This second point is especially troubling, as the Supreme Court
often closely ties its holdings in cases interpreting civil rights statutes to the
text of the statute in question.343
As this Note discusses, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the disparate
impact standard in constitutional equal protection cases made the holdings
in early cases such as Black Jack, Arlington Heights II, and Rizzo less

340. Am. Ins. Ass’n, 2014 WL 5802283, at *7.
341. See supra Part II.A.
342. See supra Part II.A.
343. See, e.g., supra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s statutory analysis of the
ADEA and the reasoning behind its holdings in these cases).
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authoritative.344 Courts continue to cite these cases as authority, making
their holdings less robust and somewhat hollow.
The continued citation of these cases as direct support for the rule that
disparate impact cases are cognizable under the FHA is not necessarily
wrong and does not make the holdings in these cases per se invalid.
However, it leaves a logical lacuna in the argument that can only be filled
by close adherence to the text of the statute itself, or better yet, an
authoritative interpretation by HUD, codified in a rule promulgated with
rulemaking power under the APA.345
HUD’s disparate impact rule, § 100.500, might be able to fill this void,
because the rule has the benefit of Chevron deference.346 That is,
proponents of the disparate impact standard of liability under the FHA need
not prove that the statutory text plainly lends itself to such a reading but
only that the FHA is silent or ambiguous as to the standard, and that the
HUD rule is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.347
This essentially has the effect of lowering the proponents’ burden of
persuasion when a disparate impact claim is under judicial review.
Theoretically, this also should be the case in Inclusive Communities.
B. A Close Analysis of the Text Shows That the Statute Is Ambiguous
The debate over whether the plain meaning of the text of the FHA
supports disparate impact liability only goes to prove that the text of the
statute is ambiguous. This section first addresses the unreliability of the use
of dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of the text—specifically the
use of dictionaries in American Insurance Ass’n. Then, this section
explains how the structure of section 804(a) straddles the middle ground
between Title VII section 703(a)(1) (the disparate treatment provision) and
(a)(2) (the disparate impact provision). Finally, this section argues that the
reasoning of Smith and Gross is inconclusive when applied to the FHA,
largely because of significant structural differences between the FHA and
Title VII.
1. The Use of Dictionaries Is Inconclusive
Courts and commentators sometimes use dictionaries to decipher the
plain meaning of a statute.348 This is especially unhelpful in the context of
the FHA. Recall, for example, the discussion of Judge Leon’s use of
dictionaries in American Insurance Ass’n.349 Judge Leon lists a string of
words and definitions, and simply concludes that they all point to

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 98, 100 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra notes 326–32.
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“intentional” conduct, without any real explanation of how that inference is
made.350
First, the definitions of “refuse” and “deny” used by Judge Leon are
neutral regarding an actor’s intent. The definition of “refuse” is essentially
a positive unwillingness to do or comply with.351 The definition of “deny”
is essentially “to refuse” or to give a negative answer to.352 These
definitions speak only to actions in themselves and do not so much as hint
at motivation, purpose, or treatment based on categorical bias. When the
words are viewed within their statutory context, this neutrality becomes
even more clear: “refuse”—as in “refuse to sell or rent”—and “deny”—as
in “deny[] a dwelling”353—are simply verbs that describe an adverse action
or injury-causing outcome.
Second, the definition of “make”—as in the phrase “or otherwise make
unavailable . . . a dwelling”—that Judge Leon cites is similarly neutral. In
fact, if the definition of “make” weighs in favor of either side of the
disparate impact debate, it weighs in favor of the proponents’ interpretation
of the FHA. Judge Leon defines “make” as “‘to produce as a result of
action, effort, or behavior’ or ‘to cause to happen to or be experienced by
someone.’”354 Such a definition has the “results”-based language that
according to Jensen and Naimon,355 creates disparate impact liability in
civil rights statutes. The presence of the word “results” in the dictionary
definition of “make” has as much persuasive force as the presence of the
word “treatment” in the common usage dictionary definition of
“discriminate.”356 Realistically, the presence of either of these words in
their respective definitions is probably not indicative of Congress’s intent
when it included the words “make” and “discriminate” in the various
provisions of the FHA.
Moreover, the use of the passive voice in the phrase “to cause to happen
to or be experienced by” clearly indicates a focus on the effect of an act, not
on the actor’s motivations. Last, it is significant that the word “make,” with
the built-in results-based definition, is found in exactly the phrase that
proponents of the disparate impact standard argue is the effects-based
language in the FHA—that is, “otherwise make unavailable or deny.”357
Finally, the word “discriminate,” found in section 804(b) of the FHA,
also does not connote a requirement that a defendant act with the intention
of discriminating. This is made clear by the brief account of the historical
development of the legal definition of the word “discrimination,” which
explicitly included both disparate effect and treatment language at least
thirty-five years prior to the passage of the FHA and continues to contain
350. See supra notes 324–32.
351. See supra notes 324–32.
352. See supra notes 324–32.
353. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
354. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
355. See supra notes 297–304 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 308 and accompanying text (discussing ordinary meaning of the word
“discriminate”).
357. See supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
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the same definitions today, forty years after the passage of the FHA.358 The
fact that a dictionary of common usage such as Webster’s Third359 does not
include a definition of disparate impact discrimination is hardly surprising.
And any force that the disparate treatment language in such dictionaries had
in cutting against the availability of disparate impact claims under the FHA
is altogether neutralized by the legal definition of “discriminate.”
This account of the plain meaning of the text of the FHA does not mean
that the plain meaning of the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims. To
the contrary, the “plain meaning” of the FHA is unascertainable as it
pertains to the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the Act. That
is to say that the FHA is silent or ambiguous regarding this particular issue.
For practitioners, judges, or commentators to claim to be able to discern the
“true” meaning of the statute, or the true intent of Congress, as it pertains to
this issue, based only on the text of the statute, is to promote a fiction of the
highest order.
2. The Structure of the Statute Also Is Inconclusive and Seems to Place
Section 804(a) Somewhere Between Section 703(a)(1) and (a)(2)
Since we cannot rely on the plain meaning of the statute to determine
whether the FHA authorizes disparate impact claims, this Note now turns to
the structure of section 803(a) and (b) as they compare to Title VII section
703(a)(1) and (a)(2).
Refer back to the full text of the relevant Title VII and FHA provisions
reproduced earlier.360 One can see that, simply stated, the structure of the
section 703(a)(1) follows this basic outline: it is unlawful “to fail or refuse
to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate . . . because of race. . . .”361 Section
703(a)(2) follows a slightly different outline: it is unlawful “to limit,
segregate, or classify . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive . . . or otherwise adversely affect [a person’s employment status]
because of race. . . .”362
Section 804(a) of the FHA begins in a similar manner as section
703(a)(1), by stating that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of” a dwelling “because of race.”363
But it also makes it unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny” a
dwelling because of race.364 As explained earlier, “otherwise make
unavailable” may be read as results or effects language and thus as
authorizing disparate impact claims.365
In fact, proponents of the disparate impact standard argue that this
language is parallel to the “otherwise affect” language found in section
358.
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See supra notes 286–92 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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703(a)(2).366 It is the act of making a dwelling unavailable that is the
undesired effect. Section 703(a)(2) necessarily used the more general word
“affect” because the adverse effects in an employment context are naturally
more varied—that is, they could include a failure to hire, failure to promote,
firing, unequal pay, et cetera. The phrase “otherwise make unavailable” can
plausibly be read as the more specific parallel of the phrase “otherwise
adversely affect.”
However, “otherwise make unavailable or deny” is not definitively
“effects” language. It does not include explicit “effects” language like the
words “affect” or “results”—language the Supreme Court specifically
focuses on when determining whether a civil rights statute authorizes
disparate impact claims.
A discussion of the “because of” language here does not add much at all.
The phrase “because of race” appears in both the disparate treatment and
disparate impact provisions of Title VII. It is clear that, although the
“because of” language can be read narrowly to create liability only for
disparate treatment claims, when there is language in the statute that is
sufficient to indicate liability for disparate impact, the disparate treatment
feel of the “because of” language gives way to a disparate impact standard.
3. Smith and Gross Are Also Inconclusive Regarding
the Availability of Disparate Impact Claims Under the FHA
Both Smith and Gross are helpful guidance in reading the text of the FHA
and even offer some guidance on how to interpret the structure of the
individual statutes. However, neither is quite the “sea change”367 in
statutory construction that opponents of disparate impact liability make it
out to be.
First, the plurality’s statutory analysis in Smith interprets language that is
not found anywhere in the FHA—that is, the “otherwise adversely affect”
language.368 However, Smith is important, because for the first time it
makes explicit which provision of Title VII (and the ADEA) gives rise to
disparate impact liability—section 703(a)(2). Therefore, it gives scholars
and practitioners some guidance on what kind of language will give rise to
disparate impact liability based on the plain language of the statute. And,
while it does not limit the language that gives rise to disparate impact
liability only to that language, it does explicitly hold that the language in
section 703(a)(1) only authorizes disparate treatment claims.
Gross is helpful as well because it interprets the “because of” language
that is also found in the FHA. Gross held that the “because of” language in
the disparate treatment provision of the ADEA required that a claimant’s
protected status be a but-for cause of the disparate treatment.369 This is a
strict reading of this language, but it is still not determinative of whether the
366.
367.
368.
369.
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FHA authorizes disparate impact claims. As indicated above, the “because
of” language has a very different effect on the rest of the statute if the
balance of the statutory language lends itself to a disparate impact reading.
Thus, considering the language and structure of the FHA, as well as the
recent Supreme Court cases that have called into question the past forty
years of case history surrounding disparate impact liability under the Act,
the only clear conclusion that can be made about the FHA is that the FHA is
silent, or at least ambiguous, as to whether disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the Act.
C. The HUD Rule Is a Reasonable Interpretation of the FHA
This section argues that, under Chevron Step Two, HUD’s disparate
impact rule is reasonable and that courts should defer to the expertise of
HUD in deciding whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA.
That the HUD rule is reasonable does not seem contentious. It did not
create new liabilities, but rather clarified doctrine that had organically
developed in nearly every circuit court in the United States.370
Furthermore, as Judge St. Eve noted in Donovan,371 the burden-shifting test
that HUD adopted is similar to the tests that were already being applied by
the courts and is also very similar to the burden-shifting test under Title
VII.372
HUD is also best equipped to determine whether the disparate impact
standard is essential to accomplishing the broad remedial purposes of the
FHA—that is, ending, ameliorating, and preventing segregation and
housing discrimination.373 HUD has the benefit of having observed,
studied, and participated in forty years of disparate impact litigation under
the FHA. And while the case law is not the most well-reasoned precedent
to rely upon for finding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
the Act, it gives HUD the advantage of knowing in advance how its
interpretation will affect such concerns as: the breadth of liability, the
likelihood of frivolous claims, and, most importantly, the efficacy of the
disparate impact standard in accomplishing the goals of the FHA.
CONCLUSION
The HUD disparate impact rule, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, essentially saves
the FHA disparate impact standard from an uncertain fate. There is an
essential flaw in the FHA’s judicial precedent regarding disparate impact
claims that has not been properly dealt with. Thus, the availability of
disparate impact claims under the FHA must rest on the text of the statute
itself or an interpretation of the statute by an expert such as HUD. The
HUD rule essentially fills the void that the judicial precedent and
370.
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372.
373.
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ambiguous language leaves by offering the disparate impact standard
enough protection to withstand judicial review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

